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The decade of the sixties bore witness to many broad and often 
tumultuous changes within American society. Among the more dramatic 
of these changes was the marked reawakening of social consciousness—an 
awareness that there are intimate and unbreakable connections between 
the private life of the individual and the public life of society, and that 
personal responsibility, though founded in the private, must extend to 
the public as well. It is impossible to determine accurately how pervasive 
this reawakening was; certainly it would be risky to read too much into 
the wide and often intense publicity it received and to conclude that it 
had penetrated every section of the population at equal strength. 
One may safely conclude, however, that the new sense of social con-
cern became the trademark of the country's intellectuals, especially those 
associated with journalism, the academic life and the church. The press, 
which as an institution had been considered during the fifties to be 
more or less a supporter of the governmental establishment, became in 
the sixties a gadfly for social reform and was largely responsible for 
bringing about the eventual change in official policy regarding the 
Vietnam war. Much has been said about the general mood of apathy 
which characterized college campuses of the fifties, and although this 
judgment is in some ways superficial, it is essentially accurate. A descrip-
tion by Jack Kerouac recalls what was then a not uncommon academic 
atmosphere: "Japrry and I were kind of outlandish-looking on the 
campus in our old clothes in fact Japhy was considered an eccentric 
around the campus, which is the usual thing for campuses and college 
people to think whenever a real man appears on the scene—colleges 
being nothing but grooming schools for the middle class nonentity which 
usually finds its perfect expression on the outskirts of the campus in 
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rows of well-to-do houses with lawns and television sets in each living 
room with everybody looking at the same thing and thinking the same 
thing at the same time. . . Z'1 The campus he is talking about is Berkeley! 
We are all familiar enough with the radically contrasting picture of the 
sixties. 
Traditionally, the most conservative of social institutions has been the 
Church. (Incidentally, I am using this term in the broadest possible 
sense, to include Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious groups.) This 
has been as true in America as anywhere else, with an important differ-
ence. Because of the pluralistic nature of religious life in this country, 
no single group has ever had the kind of sustained predominant influence 
upon national life as has been the case in Europe—in England, France 
or Spain, for example. The Church, or more correctly churches, did not 
make a practice of attempting directly to influence political decisions. 
Rarely did they have to. The tactic was different, one of indirection: a 
matter of producing the "good citizen" who would dutifully support the 
social ideology espoused by the churches. In the sixties this pattern 
changed substantially as more and more churchmen took the virtually un-
precedented stand of speaking out against either the policies of the federal 
government or against general aspects of American culture. This was 
not merely a matter of isolated instances here and there, but a pattern 
of behavior which was markedly different from that of the preceding 
decade. Among the churchmen who gained national prominence for 
their outspokenness were Daniel and Philip Berrigan, James Groppi, 
Sloan Coffin, Malcolm Boyd and Abraham Heschel. The extent of the 
new pattern of behavior was indicated by the resurgence of a group like 
the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the founding of another, Clergy 
and Others United Against the War in Vietnam. 
Thomas Merton, who died in December 1968, was one of the most 
notable of the American churchmen who experienced an awakening of 
social consciousness in the sixties and began energetically to employ his 
talents as a writer to bring other people, particularly Catholics, to a 
similar awakening. Because of the many ways in which he was so thor-
oughly a "man of his time," becoming acquainted with the nature of his 
experience can provide us with a better insight into the larger phenome-
non in which he was an important actor. Merton was a monk, but what-
ever stereotypes that might call forth would very likely be of little help 
in understanding him, for he was far from being a staid, tradition-bound 
denizen of the cloister. 
The problem of classifying Merton would be simple could we stop 
with the conclusion that he was a famous "spiritual writer" and nothing 
more.2 In fact, he was considerably more: a good minor poet, a compe-
tent theologian, a general philosopher, a sensitive literary critic, an 
accomplished translator as well as biographer, a so-so novelist, a good 
historian, a skilled journalist and a remarkably accurate prophet. In all, 
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his works, which number over fifty volumes, provide a rich and highly 
diversified body of reading. 
From the point of view I am taking in this essay, Merton's works are 
easily divisible into two large categories, categories which are charac-
terized by the predominant attitude he takes toward social issues in each. 
These two categories are worth pausing over because they represent the 
most dramatic and the clearest index of the change in his social outlook. 
First of all, let me state the case in the simplest way possible, after 
which I will concentrate on elaboration and analysis. From the time he 
gained national recognition as a writer (we can use 1948 as a convenient 
benchmark, the year The Seven Storey Mountain was published)3 until 
about the middle of the 1950's, there was a notable lack of social concern 
displayed in his writings. From the middle fifties until the end of his 
life, however, that pattern was reversed; he began to dedicate more and 
more time to social issues, and during the decade of the sixties most of 
what he wrote related directly or indirectly to the problems of society, 
chiefly those dealing with war and race. For convenience and for want 
of anything more imaginative, in subsequent discussion of these two 
phases in Merton's writing I will refer to the first as the other-worldly 
phase and to the second as the this-worldly phase. 
In the other-worldly phase Merton devoted himself primarily to 
poetry which dealt almost exclusively with religious themes, to biog-
raphy, to hagiography and to meditative prose. Among specific titles 
which can be cited are Thirty Poems, A Man in the Divided Sea, Figures 
for an Apocalypse, What Are These Wounds?, Exile Ends in Glory, The 
Waters of Siloe and The Seven Storey Mountain. At this point in his 
career Merton was advocating, implicitly if not explicitly, a rather strict 
separation between the religious life which he had adopted by becoming 
a monk, and the "world," the secular society from which he had with-
drawn. Clearly, life in the monastery was superior to that outside the 
walls. 
These sheds and cloisters 
The very stones and beams are all befriended 
By cleaner sun, by rarer birds, by lovelier flowers.4 
In contrast to this idyllic setting there was the secular alternative: 
The pale world, white as plaster, 
(Its doors are dumb, its windows far too blind 
for lamentation) 
Dies like problematical news. 
We have receded from the things 
You printed on those unidentified facades. 
We barely dream about the frontispiece 
Of your collapsing palaces. 
We can refuse your tin.5 
39 
At this time he was more concerned with the individual than with the 
community, and this concern sprang directly from the attitude toward 
religion which was then governing his life, an attitude which was heavily 
tinged by Romanticism. He saw the religious quest as a highly private 
affair, a lonely, Byronesque confrontation between the single soul and 
God. According to this point of view each person works out his salvation 
pretty much in isolation from the rest of mankind; in fact, society or the 
"world" can prove to be a serious obstacle along the road to perfection. 
Here in these white-hot solitudes 
We have outstripped the level of deception; 
We are beyond the doors of de vil-trap.6 
He believed that a person draws closer to God in spite of human society 
rather than because of it, and that consequently the monastic life he was 
leading was the most efficient means to sanctity. 
No Man Is An Island, published in 1955, was the book which first 
heralded the fact that there was to be a distinct shift in emphasis in his 
attitude toward society. The very first sentence contains the clue: "A 
happiness that is sought for ourselves alone can never be found, for 
happiness that is diminished by being shared is not big enough to make 
us happy/'7 But it was in Disputed Questions (1960) that the case be-
came abundantly clear and he began to treat explicitly of specific social 
problems and to demonstrate that he had definitely moved away from 
his other-worldly attitude and was adopting a new stance. There are two 
essays in the book which are worth calling special attention to, "Chris-
tianity and Totalitarianism," and a lengthy (sixty-seven pages) critical 
commentary on the Russian novelist Boris Pasternak. The thesis of the 
first essay is that both the Eastern and Western camps are in imminent 
danger of succumbing completely to totalitarianism. The antidote to 
this poisonous progression, he argued, was Christianity, for Christianity 
stands opposed to a totalitarian view of life. Bringing it down to the 
level of the individual, he maintained that it was the duty of each 
Christian to dedicate all his energies to combatting the spread of totali-
tarianism. The most significant aspect of the essay was his clearly stated 
contention that it will no longer do for the Christian to turn his back on 
society and run off to the mountains. Each individual has serious respon-
sibilities toward society. "The task of the Christian in our times is the 
same as it has always been: to build the Kingdom of God in this world."8 
When Merton spoke of Christianity as unalterably opposed to 
totalitarianism he was proceeding from one of the fundamental assump-
tions of his thought: that not every person, or group, which is called 
Christian is in fact Christian. He subscribed to Kierkegaard's distinction 
between Christianity and Christendom, and, like Kierkegaard, he seemed 
to believe that the number of true Christians, that is, those whose belief 
in the Gospels is actually reflected in the way they conduct their lives, 
would never be large. If the habit did not make the monk—a truism 
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with which he was quite familiar—by the same token simply the name 
Christian did not make a Christian. He was well aware that there are 
many so-called Christians, citizens of Christendom, who in one way or 
another further the cause of totalitarianism, but by reason of the fact 
that such people were not true Christians, what they did could not be 
laid at the feet of Christianity. 
The essay on Boris Pasternak has a special significance because it 
provides us with a solid, albeit disguised, rationale for Mer ton's change 
of heart regarding social issues. In the main, the essay is a rhapsodic 
eulogy for a writer whom he admired deeply, as well as for a friend and 
correspondent.9 From it we conclude that he admired Pasternak as 
much, perhaps more, for the way he lived, for his attitude toward his 
society, as for the way he wrote. To Merton, Pasternak was a man of 
complete, unimpeachable integrity, a man who, in addition, had to pay 
dearly to preserve his integrity. He lived in a society whose leaders 
eventually came to regard him as an enemy and, because he would not 
modify his views to please the regime, made life very difficult for him. 
In time, his identity as a writer and as a man came to rest in great part 
upon his role as an opponent of the status quo. Merton went from ad-
miring this kind of integrity to imagining it was his duty to imitate it. 
He began to regard himself as a writer who had essentially the same 
kind of obligation toward society which Pasternak had envisioned for 
himself. But in doing so, and because of the depth of his conviction on 
issues such as the Vietnam war, he allowed himself to see more analogues 
between Soviet and American society than in fact existed. For a sensitive 
intellectual, there were undoubtedly many frustrating aspects to life in 
America during the decade of the sixties, but conditions were still a far 
cry from those to be found in Russia. Specifically, an American writer 
was subjected to nowhere near the kind of pressures and prohibitions 
which were the predictable lot of the Russian writer who wanted to 
produce anything but formulistic socialist realism. But whatever exag-
gerations there were in Merton's tendency to liken his plight to Paster-
nak's, it did show that henceforth he was going to involve himself more 
directly in the society in which he lived. 
In order to highlight the basic distinction between Merton's other-
worldly and this-worldly phase, I have painted with rather broad strokes. 
Some important qualifications are necessary. It would be a distortion, 
for example, to maintain that there was nothing in Merton's earlier writ-
ings (i.e., pre-1955) to indicate a man who was sympathetic toward his 
fellows in the world and sensitive to the problems of society. One has 
only to note that while he was a student at Columbia his social con-
sciousness was acute, as is evidenced by such things as his membership 
in the Communist Party. He was reading widely at the time in Marx and 
other social philosophers and occasionally took part in demonstrations, 
and he had taken the "Oxford Pledge" not to become involved in any 
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war for whatever cause. His decision to convert to Roman Catholicism 
(1938) and his subsequently joining a monastic community (1941) can, 
it is true, be interpreted as indications that much of his original social 
concern had cooled—in large measure because of his disillusionment with 
Communism—but it did not die. In his early monastic writings we detect 
him regularly referring to the thesis that the monk's action of turning 
from the world to lead a life of seclusion is praiseworthy only to the 
degree that in rejecting the world he accepts it. The idea behind the 
paradox is that the monk rejects the material accoutrements of his 
society, but he does not reject its human components. In fact, the monk's 
life of prayer and sacrifice is primarily for the people in the world, that 
they, like he, may come to see that the "one thing necessary" is to love 
God above all else and to lead one's life according to that love. Merton 
saw an important bond of responsibility which united the monk, on a 
spiritual plane, with the society of which he was inextricably a part. 
After his views altered, he continued to argue that the essential respon-
sibility of the monk toward the world was spiritual; the difference lay in 
the fact that he had other responsibilities as well. It was still vitally 
important that he pray and sacrifice for his fellow man, but he must also 
aid him by more direct means as well. This meant, among other things, 
taking a stand on social and political issues. 
That qualification provides an important link between the two phases 
of his thought, for Merton continued throughout his life to emphasize 
the primacy of the spiritual. If he saw it as necessary for the monk to 
become more actively involved in the problems of society, he was ada-
mant in insisting that such involvement must be based upon and moti-
vated by considerations which were supported by transcendent principles. 
Action which lacked a metaphysical dimension, he argued, soon de-
generated into activism, action for the sake of action. Activism was the 
fruit of the fallacious notion that so long as you were "involved," doing 
something, anything, you were having a good effect; you were furthering 
the cause of peace or racial justice.10 Not only was this a fallacious 
notion; it was also dangerous, for the person or group who makes a be-all 
and end-all of action inevitably succumbs to the non-solution of violence. 
Those who put all their trust in action eventually suffer the frustration 
which follows upon the realization that their action is not changing 
things in the manner that they thought it would, or as fast as they 
thought it would, and in their frustration they attempt to force the issue. 
If others are too blind to see the rightness of the cause, then, by God, they 
will make them see. The sad end result, too often, is that there is no 
difference whatsoever between the antagonists.11 Those who claim to 
be for peace and for love are just as violent and hateful as the avowed 
proponents of war and hatred. We are reduced to the final absurdity of 
having desperately dedicated people who are quite willing to kill for 
peace, to hate for the sake of love. 
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His total commitment to non-violence and his sensitivity to how 
easily the activist mentality can degenerate into violence are both illus-
trated by his sharp reaction to the two protest suicides which took place 
in this country, within eight days of one another, in 1965. In the first 
instance, a young Quaker burned himself to death in front of the 
Pentagon; in the second a staff member of The Catholic Worker (a paper 
to which Merton contributed many articles) did the same in front of the 
United Nations building. The second incident, according to Gordon 
Zahn, almost led Merton to sever ties with organized peace activity, spe-
cifically with the Catholic Peace Fellowship, one of the peace groups 
with which he was closely associated. Initially, he requested that his 
name be withdrawn as a supporter of the group, for fear that people 
would think that he condoned such nihilistic acts. In the end he was 
persuaded to continue in his position as a sponsor of the group, with 
the understanding that such sponsorship did not "imply automatic ap-
proval of any and every move made by this group, still less of individual 
action on the part of its members, acting on their own responsibility."12 
Toward the end of his life he seemed to grow more and more skeptical 
of organized activity, no matter how noble the cause toward which it was 
directed, and more than once he officially "signed-off" from public in-
volvement, giving notice that he had said all he could say and done all 
he could do for peace. It was time for him to concentrate on being a 
monk, he claimed, for insofar as he made any contribution toward the 
betterment of human-kind, it was primarily to the degree that he was 
loyal to his monastic identity. 
One can easily see that the two phases of Merton's writing, which 
roughly coincide, respectively, with the decades of the fifties and the 
sixties, reflect the attitude toward social issue which predominated in 
each of those decades. Americans in the fifties were supremely conscious 
of living under the shadow of the bomb, and the main effect of this 
consciousness was an inclination to withdraw into a smaller, safer world. 
A highly confined togetherness was the watchword. Concern for social 
problems was minimal, probably because of an unadmitted conviction 
that society as presently known was not going to be around all that much 
longer. Incongruously juxtaposed to this tacit doomsday outlook was a 
business-as-usual ethic. Though living on the brink, Americans were 
frenetically active in adding to their affluence, as if an accumulation of 
material goods would, by some sort of magical process, effectively dissi-
pate the shadows which brooded in the background. The basic selfishness 
which fed this kind of activity served to obviate the possibility of a 
balanced social consciousness. Popular religious leaders of the decade, 
though not exactly condoning America's rampant materialism, nonethe-
less did little to emphasize the social dimension of the religious messages 
they conveyed. Billy Graham was able to draw thousands to his evange-
listic crusades, but what he stressed was personal conversion. Little or 
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nothing was said of the need to reform society. This other-worldly 
orientation is tellingly reflected in three religious books which were very 
popular during the fifties: Fulton J. Sheen's Peace of Soul, Joshua Lieb-
mann's Peace of Mind, and Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of Posi-
tive Thinking. 
There is little doubt that Merton was influenced, at least indirectly, 
during the late forties and the fifties by what was then the prevailing 
attitude of American churchmen, and intellectuals generally, toward 
social issues. At any rate, given the fact that that attitude roughly co-
incided with his own, which he had arrived at in a fairly independent 
fashion, there was not much reason why he should have stood out as one 
who was attempting to buck the current. The situation is considerably 
different, however, when we focus attention upon his this-worldly phase. 
Here Merton, though certainly not beyond the influence of others, was 
on the whole more the influencer rather than the influenced, and in fact 
it was he who contributed as much as anyone in bringing about among 
American churchmen a renaissance of social concern during the sixties. 
He was definitely a leader in this respect.13 
I have already mentioned No Man Is An Island and Disputed Ques-
tions as being pivotal books, in that they were the first to display his 
new attitude toward society. After these two, the titles were to multiply 
rapidly, and Merton tended to state his views more and more forthrightly 
as time progressed. Among the books which best characterize his this-
worldly phase are Breakthrough to Peace, Conjectures of a Guilty By-
stander, Emblems of a Season of Fury, Faith and Violence, Redeeming 
the Time and Seeds of Destruction. 
There were two specific issues which Merton focused on in his writing 
on social issues, race and war. The choice was a deliberate one. He con-
sidered these two issues to be the most pressing which faced the modern 
world, and the former, of course, was of particular importance to the 
United States. He was especially sensitive to the race issue in this coun-
try, a fact which very likely had its roots in the experience he had 
working in a Harlem settlement house before he entered the monastery. 
Out of this experience came the moving description of the degraded 
condition of ghetto blacks which is found in The Seven Storey Mountain, 
a passage which so impressed Eldridge Cleaver that he regularly referred 
to it as part of his Black Muslim lectures. Part of it reads: "All the senses 
and imagination and sensibilities and emotions and sorrows and desires 
and hopes and ideas of a race with vivid feelings and deep emotional 
reactions are forced in upon themselves, bound inward by an iron ring 
of frustration: the prejudice which hems them in with its four insur-
mountable walls."14 When the black ghettoes exploded in the summer 
of 1967 Merton was perhaps the least surprised of all Americans, for- he 
had effectively predicted the outbreak some three years before. In Seeds 
of Destruction, published in 1964, he wrote that "we can now expect 
44 
violent, though perhaps disorganized and sporadic, initiatives in force 
around the edges of the Negro slums."15 The historian Martin Marty 
reviewed the book the same year it came out and chided Mer ton for his 
unwarranted pessimism. After the riots, however, Marty returned to the 
book and came up with a revised analysis. "What bothers me," he said 
in a review addressed to Merton, "is the degree of accuracy in your pre-
dictions and prophecies in general."16 
Merton was reluctant to take any credit for prophecy in this instance, 
for he felt that what he had predicted could have been predicted by any-
one who had even an inkling of the conditions under which the majority 
of black Americans were living. In 1941 Harlem seemed to him a 
"seething cauldron."17 He knew that the conditions he observed there 
at the time had not substantially improved in the intervening twenty 
years. If anything, they had grown worse. It took neither genius nor 
preternatural perspicuity to conclude, then, that if the pressure con-
tinued to build within the black communities, and if the larger and 
controlling white community took no appreciable steps to alleviate that 
pressure, which he felt it did not, then the blow-up was only a matter of 
time. The fact was, however, that when it did come it was a shock to 
many white Americans. This, for Merton, only underscored the total 
obliviousness of white America to the nature and extent of the crisis. 
Conversely it is a tribute to Merton's perceptiveness as an amateur sociol-
ogist that he, who was living in a secluded monastery, seemed often to be 
ahead of the professionals in the accuracy of his assessment of not only 
the situation of blacks in America, but sociological realities in general. 
At least one sociologist, Professor Gordon Zahn, saw fit to take note of 
Merton's abilities in this respect.ls 
Merton turned out to be one of the most outspoken critics of the 
Vietnam war. He regarded it as an "overwhelming atrocity,"19 a war 
which was clearly "immoral and eminently hurtful to American inter-
ests."20 That is categorical enough. As we have seen, he had demon-
strated a consistent aversion to war since his youth. Put simply, his atti-
tude was that war, though at times appearing to be an effective expedient, 
is in fact a non-solution to human problems. "There is one winner, only 
one winner, in war. The winner is war itself. Not truth, not justice, not 
liberty, not morality. These are vanquished."21 He never adopted a 
position of total pacifism, however, stopping short of maintaining that 
war under any and all circumstances was immoral and leaving the door 
open for the justification of defensive warfare. This was a concession to 
the standard Christian theological position on war, formulated by St. 
Augustine, a position which he generally abided by although he found 
many difficulties with it.22 The advent of nuclear weapons had pro-
foundly altered the nature and meaning of war, with the result that 
many of the old formulas would no longer do. 
It was in great part because he felt that many professional theologians 
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were shirking their responsibility in not dealing with contemporary 
warfare that Merton decided, though he did not look upon himself as a 
theologian, to tackle the subject himself. He felt that the situation was 
extremely volatile, given the nature of American society at the beginning 
of the sixties. Americans were displaying "almost total passivity and 
irresponsibility on the moral level," and on the other hand, a "demonic 
activism in social, military, and political life."23 It was this combination, 
he felt, which led to the pathological merry-go-round of the arms race. 
The stock-piling of nuclear weapons was a puerile game, the conse-
quences of which could be disastrous for the human race. He scoffed at 
attempts to rationalize America's "first strike capability," and expressed 
serious concern over President Kennedy's policies. In sum, his attitude 
toward nuclear war was much more definite than his attitude toward war 
in general: nuclear war was immoral. 
Merton's attempts to compose formal theological statements on the 
subject of war are unsystematic and at times confusing, and in the long 
run they were not very influential. Of much more weight were his im-
passioned, impressionistic essays, wherein he launches out against war, 
not from the point of view that it goes contrary to certain theological or 
philosophical tenets, but from the point of view that it is inhuman, an 
insult to the dignity of man. When we read what Merton had to say 
about the Vietnam war today, much of it may sound hackneyed, but 
this is so only because a large and vociferous group of American intel-
lectuals eventually came to adopt a position which he was among the 
first to take. In 1963, for example, a year before the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion, when stories about Vietnam ran on the back pages of the news-
papers, Merton was awarded the Pax Medal from the Massachusetts 
Political Action for Peace in recognition of his anti-war writings. 
His influence in the anti-war movement of the sixties was substantial, 
as is indicated, among other things, by the frequency with which several 
activist groups such as the American Friends Service Committee used his 
writings as source material for the development of their ideologies of 
resistance. Moreover, as John J. Carey rightly observes, Merton exerted 
influence on American Catholic radicals, not only in the matter of the 
war, but on many other matters as well.24 He did this primarily through 
his writing, but another means he employed, peculiar to his role as a 
monk and a priest, was the retreat. On several occasions Merton invited 
people to the Abbey of Gethsemane for conferences in which he ex-
pounded his views on war and various other social issues. One such 
retreat is noteworthy for suggesting the extent of his influence on anti-
war activists. It was held in November, 1964, and its theme was the 
"Spiritual Roots of Protest." Among the participants were A. J. Muste, 
John Howard Yoder, Rev. Daniel Berrigan, Rev. Philip Berrigan, Rev. 
Robert Cunnane and James Forest. Five of the participants were sub-
sequently to be imprisoned for their anti-war activities. The Berrigan 
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brothers were to be numbered among the "Baltimore Four" and "Catons-
ville Nine/ ' and Cunnane and James Forest were to become two of the 
"Milwaukee Fourteen."25 
We have seen that in all of his social philosophy, Merton preserved a 
steady suspicion of activism and a firm commitment to non-violence. 
These two characteristics lend a unique quality to his thought, and they 
set him apart from many other intellectuals of the sixties who, like him, 
experienced an awakening of social consciousness. Recall that, for 
Merton, the activist was, in essence, the "actor" who has gone berserk, 
one who has come to put almost absolute value on action itself, even to 
the point where the purposes of the action, if any, are either regarded 
as of secondary importance or ignored altogether. Such a state, besides 
the critical fact that it indicates serious mental imbalance on the part 
of the person in it, is from a practical point of view self-defeating. In the 
final analysis the activist accomplishes nothing because his activity is 
directionless, unguided by prudent reflection. 
Merton, of course, was trying to be just the opposite of the activist in 
his own social activity. In attempting to stir up others to commit them-
selves to social involvement he continually warned of the dangers of 
activism. This concern about activism, indeed the very concept itself, 
was a direct product of Merton's religious faith and of his identity as a 
monk belonging to a contemplative religious order, as I will attempt to 
show presently. First we must examine the make-up of the "actor," 
whom Merton sees as the opposite number of the activist. What qualities 
did Merton want him to have? Above all else he had to be a man of 
faith, which meant, among other things, that he never lost sight of his 
essential contingency. He realized that he was a dependent creature 
living in a world which—however difficult it might be at times to under-
stand—was providentially ordered. This faith, in turn, gave the person 
in question a core of inner peace, an eye of tranquility in the midst of the 
storm, which provided the basis of his stability. It was to that peaceful 
center of his being which he habitually returned to renew himself, and 
which, to mix a metaphor, prevented him from going off the deep end. 
The third quality of the "actor" was a lively sense of the limitations of 
his own actions; it was precisely the lack of this sense which more than 
anything else transformed a man into an activist. But not only was the 
"actor" cautious about his own limitations. He was very skeptical of 
social panaceas—those grandiose schemes which promised overnight to 
make all the world right for one cause or another. Finally, in a healthy, 
non-debilitating way, he was acutely conscious of his own complicity in 
the social evil he was attempting to overcome. This prevented him from 
being transformed into a self-righteous, stainless crusader who sees him-
self at war with diabolical forces whose evil is irreversible. For Merton, 
Hitlers come into the world because there is a bit of the Hitler in us all. 
An intriguing aspect of Merton's analysis of the activist personality is 
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his discussion of the despair which ultimately becomes the dominant 
factor in the activist's life. On the surface, this despair is the result of the 
conviction that one's actions are ineffectual. On a deeper plane, however, 
it is an index of Merton's peculiar brand of prometheanism, whereby a 
man, in stealing the divine fire, commits an act of gratuitous egotism be-
cause the fire was there for the taking in the first place, a gift of God. 
Promethean man, the activist, goes into despair not because there is no 
hope but because the hope lies outside himself, and the sign of his despair 
is his frenetic activity. "For since Prometheus cannot conceive of a true 
victory, his own triumph is to let the vulture devour his liver: he will be 
a martyr and a victim, because the gods he has created in his own image 
represent his own tyrannical demands upon himself. There is only one 
issue in his struggle with them: glorious defiance in a luxury of de-
spair."26 Thus the activist is doubly doomed, by a world which has be-
come too much for him, and by his own torturing ego which will not 
leave him in peace. 
In view of what has been said, it is perhaps already evident how Mer-
ton's whole concern for activism emerged naturally from his religious 
faith. It is, of course, a major tenet of the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
that man depends totally upon God and that what man can do to bring 
about changes in his environment is always bounded by factors over 
which he may have no knowledge and/or over which he may have no 
control. But a more direct, and I think more interesting, influence upon 
Merton's formulations on this concept was the fact that he was a monk 
belonging to a community which was traditionally identified as non-
active. Though the Order of the Cistercians of the Strict Observance 
numbers many priests among its members, these clerics do not engage in 
an active ministry, but, like the rest of the monks, live a quiet, sequestered 
life whose two main ingredients are prayer and work. Though Merton 
radically changed his attitude toward society at a certain period in his 
life, as we have seen, this change was brought about very much within 
the context of his role as a monk. The question was, How can I, as a 
monk whose life is dedicated to contemplation, become more involved in 
social issues? It was never, How can I become less a monk? His strong 
and fundamental commitment to monasticism, then, acted as a curb on 
his personal involvement. And that commitment, as well as his total 
monastic consciousness with its built-in wariness of activity, contributed 
substantially to his ideas on activism. 
It is my judgment that these ideas contributed positively to Merton's 
activity on behalf of racial justice and world peace, as well as to his social 
philosophy in general. Particularly, I think it lent to both activity and 
philosophy an impressive balance. Very seldom did he advocate any kind 
of activity which was not founded on a rational basis. In the matter of 
race, he several times made it clear that he could understand the sense of 
frustration and impatience which prompted American blacks, especially 
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young militants, to turn to violence to effect the social changes they felt 
were crucial. But it was one thing to understand activity, another to 
condone it, and in this matter, despite his deep sympathy for blacks and 
their cause, Merton never allowed himself to slip carelessly from the one 
to the other. He probably tried as hard as any white intellectual in 
America to understand the minds and motivations of his black fellow 
citizens ("Most of us are congenitally unable to think black," he once 
said, "and yet that is precisely what we must do before we can even hope 
to understand the crisis in which we find ourselves."),27 but he was always 
careful not to confuse false sympathy with true. True sympathy would 
recognize the violent route as a dead end, and would not hesitate to call 
it that, no matter what accusations of "compromiser" or "traitor" it might 
bring down upon one's head for doing so. Violence is more often than not 
inspired by hatred, and hatred is a poison which leaves no survivors, 
which makes the price for using it prohibitive: "If I hate my brother and 
seek to destroy him, I destroy myself also."28 Eldridge Cleaver, who 
agreed with Merton on other issues as well, came eventually to adopt his 
view on this matter when he admitted that "the price of hating other 
human beings is loving oneself less."29 
Perhaps Merton came closest to intemperance in the matter of the 
Vietnam war. Like many other sincere critics of the conflict, he at times 
dabbled in simplifications, as when he entertained rather complicated 
conspiratorial theories to explain American involvement in Vietnam, 
momentarily forgetting perhaps the variable human capacities for simple 
bungling on a massive scale. But that was the exception rather than the 
rule. His tack was to avoid facile dichotomies of good guys versus bad 
guys, for, whatever might be the temporary psychological comfort of such 
black-and-white vision, it had little to do with the real world. If he casti-
gated America's role in Vietnam, which he did, it was not to look upon 
Russia or China or North Vietnam as stalwart and impeccable defenders 
of all that was just and right and enduringly human. He was not among 
those intellectuals, many of whom should have known better, who pressed 
for the instant canonization of Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh. It is 
interesting that in his Preface to the Vietnamese edition of No Man Is 
An Island, he makes a judicious effort to avoid tracing the causes of the 
war to any specific ideological or national sources. Rather, he sees the war 
as the eruption of a deep sickness which plagues all of mankind, a mani-
festation of an "inner confusion of men in other nations in different parts 
of the earth."30 
This balance in Merton's social philosophy is most clearly manifested, 
with regard to both racial issues and the war, in his continuing estimate of 
America and its culture. Ever since his Columbia days he had been a critic 
of American culture, but only obliquely so. The real target was Western 
civilization, which he regarded as mortally wounded and stumbling to-
ward its grave. Besides the fact that this has been a favorite notion of 
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European intellectuals and artists since World War One, it had the 
peculiar value, for Merton, of putting into a larger perspective what he 
thought of American culture. In a word, he was much less extreme in his 
estimate of that culture than were, say, the bitter blacks for whom Amer-
ica became Amerika, or the intense anti-war proponents for whom the 
country was suddenly transformed into the epitome of everything which 
was hypocritical and vulgar and generally unconscionable. Thus a Daniel 
Berrigan, striking the pose of a latter-day St. John of the Cross, could 
speak of "the pervasive horror and violence of American history."31 
And he was apparently convinced, or at least he said, that "most Ameri-
cans would find the words of their Constitution and Declaration in-
tolerable."32 Philip Berrigan spoke of "the long years of my devotion to 
the flag, to an unreflecting justification of law and order . . . ," a devotion 
and a justifying process which eventually were to be negated when "the 
exorcism of [his] soul began,"33 and he came to see his country in a new, 
hyper-critical light. The source of these, and so many comparable, atti-
tudes, is a deep and painful disillusionment, a sense of wounded inno-
cence at the harsh revelation that America the pristine was not that 
pristine after all. 
Merton was spared any such disillusionment because he was never 
under any illusions in the first place as to the nature of the country and 
its culture. He had a much more cosmopolitan outlook than did the 
majority of his fellow American intellectuals. Born in France, and re-
ceiving most of his basic education in that country and in England, he 
did not come to live permanently in the United States until he was 
nineteen. He became an American citizen at the age of thirty-six, 
mainly, he explained, on account of Emily Dickinson and Henry David 
Thoreau. Because of this background he was never imbued with the kind 
of uncritical patriotism which was the burden of other intellectuals and 
which they divested themselves of, often with trauma, and often not with-
out producing as part of the aftermath a severely distorted conception of 
the relative virtues and vices of their national culture. 
Violence, as we have seen, is inextricably tied up with the activist tem-
perament, for violence is fed by hatred and the activist is one who has 
long since despaired of the possibilities of love. Non-violence, besides 
being the concomitant and natural expression of love, was, for Merton, the 
sine qua non of any kind of concerted social activity. It is difficult to say 
exactly when he espoused the principles of non-violence, but most likely 
it was before the decade of the sixties began. As to where he came upon 
those principles, no conjecture is necessary: he was an ideological disciple 
of Mohandas K. Gandhi. Following Gandhi, Merton stressed the point 
that non-violence was not simply another tool by which one gained certain 
political ends, or even brought about unity among men. The concept 
was "incomprehensible if it is thought to be a means of achieving unity 
rather than as the fruit of inner unity already achieved."34 The man of 
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non-violence, then, was one who had ''gotten himself together" in the 
sense that he was not at war with himself, and not being at war with 
himself he was not at war with any other man. 
Internal unity, the result of the individual loving himself, was the 
hallmark of the non-violent man, and his goal was to bring about exter-
nal unity, a state in which individuals love one another. This striving 
for unity necessarily entailed the breaking down of false divisions, for 
example, the division between Friend and Enemy or between the Sacred 
and the Secular. The non-violent person has no one whom he hates and 
wants to destroy, thus, "the only way truly to 'overcome' an enemy is to 
help him become other than an enemy."35 By disregarding the distinc-
tion between the sacred and the secular in favor of making all things 
sacred, Gandhi was in effect transforming politics into a holy enterprise. 
Merton was never able sufficiently to overcome his deep-set antipathy 
for things political to allow him to go quite that far, but unquestionably 
the Gandhian position did influence him to go as far as he did in involv-
ing himself in social issues. 
Though Merton advocated non-violence for those who would involve 
themselves in social activity, he realistically conceded that in fact very 
few people would be capable of faithfully adhering to the doctrine. Con-
trary to the opinion of disparagers, non-violence, far from being an index 
of weakness, in fact often called for strength of heroic proportions. He 
felt that Martin Luther King was an exemplary proponent of non-violent 
direct action, but he also knew that the Martin Luther Kings are few and 
far between. 
To be sure, Merton's advocacy of non-violence had not a little to do 
with the fact that many of its tenets were an intrinsic part of the spiritu-
ality of the monastic tradition. One need only mention, for example, 
that tradition's emphasis upon the goal of unity between the individual 
and a larger, transcendental reality, the internal freedom which that 
unity guaranteed, and the love which should bind individual to in-
dividual. There is no question that love, a love which sought unity 
and abhorred divisiveness, was what chiefly prompted Merton radically 
to change the course of his life in the 1960's and to engage in various 
activities for which, however important he thought them, he had no 
natural liking. This is not to say that he was not motivated by ideology, 
for he was, but in the end he was convinced that if peace and unity and 
justice were the goal, among races or among nations, then nothing was 
better calculated to clear the path to that goal than the disarming sim-
plicity of love. 
We are still too close to the sixties to be able to interpret that decade 
and its many explosive events with the kind of thoroughness and assur-
ance they deserve. It certainly was among the most interesting decades 
of the century, and it may one clay prove to be among the most significant 
in the history of the nation. One of the reasons for this would be that 
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during it many of the country's intellectuals awoke to a new social con-
sciousness and, in turn, and by virtue of their influence, heightened the 
social consciousness of the nation as a whole. Among these intellectuals 
was the unlikely figure of a Trappist monk who, throughout all the 
tumult, never left his monastery in the hills of Kentucky, and yet who 
certainly exerted great influence upon his fellow intellectuals and very 
probably upon the country at large. Many have discovered in both his 
temperament and the role he played vis-a-vis his society remarkable 
comparisons to Thoreau, and it would not come as a surprise to me if 
we see over the years a growing consciousness of the similarities between 
these two men, both recluses, after a fashion, both social critics, both 
possessed of a resilient and ultimately redeeming sense of humor. 
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